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INTRODUCTION
In the past fifty years, Native American tribal reservations have
emerged as enticing locations and partnership opportunities for outside businesses. As tribes are sovereign nations, not subject to many
of the regulations and taxes that are found off-reservation, has led to
an explosion of business and a potential for investors. However, this
unique status that provides an opportunity for great wealth also comes
with the issue of enforceability of contracts; two prevalent issues are
the enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses and the collection of
awards. Although reservations were not historically viewed as desirable
business locations, some businesses, particularly those involved in payday lending, have now begun to utilize the jurisdictional complications
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for their benefits. It is important to understand that the arbitration and
forum selection clause issues within contracts between Native American
tribes and non-Native American businesses or individuals have not been
settled by the courts and are ongoing, as demonstrated by the pending
appeal in Jackson v. Payday Financial Inc.1 and Inetianbor v. CashCall,
Inc.2 and the recent reversal and remand by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC.3
Part II will explore the historical approach to the use of arbitration
clauses in contracts between Native American tribes and non-Native
Americans, including the unique nature of Native American tribal sovereignty and sovereign immunity. Part III will discuss the Supreme Court
cases of C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma4 and Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc.5 Additionally, Part III will examine the following
developments: how tribes and tribal courts are currently addressing disputes, awards, jurisdiction, and the appeals process; the use of clauses
such as forum selection clauses invoking tribal jurisdiction today; and
the recent involvement of arbitration clauses within contracts between
Native American tribes and non-Native Americans. Finally, Part IV will
address policy recommendations.

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94095 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2012), appeal docketed, No. 122617 (7th Cir., Sept. 21, 2012).
2
2013 WL 4494125 (S.D.Fla. 2013), appeal docketed, No. 13-13822 (11th Cir.,
Oct. 30, 2013).
3
No. 12-2617, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16257 (7th Cir., Aug. 22, 2014).
4
532 U.S. 411 (2011).
5
523 U.S. 751 (1998).
1
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I. Rise of Arbitration, Native American Tribal Sovereign
Immunity & Jurisdiction
a. History of Arbitration
Although modern arbitration in the United States was not common
until the early 1920s,6 it existed before the time of Alexander the Great7
and is even mentioned in George Washington’s will.8 As with many
of our legal procedures, the United States inherited arbitration from
England, where the agreement to arbitrate commercial disputes was first
referred to in 1224.9 Massachusetts became the first colony to adopt
laws supporting arbitration in 1632.10 Modern arbitration in the United
States was born in 1925 with the adoption of the Federal Arbitration
Act, which “shaped modern arbitration” and changed the way business
would be conducted.11 However, prior to the arrival of Europeans in the
Americas, Native American tribes used arbitration to settle both disputes within and between tribes.12
Within business contracts, mandatory arbitration clauses are very
common and are utilized as a tool to keep disputes out of court and,
in many cases, minimize potential losses.13 Between 1990 and 2001,
See Richard A. Bales, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT 5 (1997) (CITING FRANCES KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1952)).
7
Id.; see Robin Lane Fox, The Search for Alexander 113-14 (1980) (noting that
Philip II of Macedonia, Alexander the Great’s father, specified the use of arbitration
in disputes that may arise under his peace treaty with city-states in southern Greece in
337 B.C.).
8
See Bales, supra note 5, at 5 (The first President of the United States’ will
provided that any disputes regarding his intention would be resolved by a panel of
three arbitrators and that the decision of the arbitrators would be “as binding on the
Parties as if it had been given in the Supreme Court of the United States”) (citing Am.
Arbitration Ass’n, Arbitration News 2 (1963)).
9
See Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Anthony V. Sinicropi, Improving the Arbitration Process:
A Primer for Advocates, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 463, 465 (1991).
10
See Steven A. Certilman, A Brief History of Arbitration in the United States, 3
N.Y. Dispute Resolution Lawyer 10, 10 (2010).
11
See Byron Allyn Rice, Comment, Enforceable or Not?: Class Action Waivers in
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 Hous. L. Rev.
215, 221 (2008-09).
12
See Certilman, supra note 9, at 10; see Robert V. Massey, Jr., History of Arbitration
and Grievance Arbitration in the United States, http://www.laborstudiesandresearch.
ext.wvu.edu/r/download/32003 (last visited Dec. 1, 2013).
13
See Comment, Enforceable or Not?, supra note 10, at 217-18.
6
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over one million cases were filed with the American Arbitration
Association—this exceeded the total number that had been filed in the
sixty-five years since its formation.14 Although arbitration clauses have
been prevalent for some time, within the past few years the clauses
themselves, and criticisms about them, have been highlighted more
in both the public media and in the judicial sphere, particularly those
which involve financial services.15 Arbitration is criticized as being a
“pay-for-justice phenomenon” due to the fact that the purportedly neutral decisionmaker is dependent on those who pay for the service.16 It is
thought to be relatively unregulated, as cases are decided “out of public
view, leaving no record or legal precedent.”17
Although there has been an increase in criticisms, there has been
a trend among the courts to be more accepting of arbitration agreements, especially those with class action waivers or mandatory arbitration. Most recently, in 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a class
action waiver contained in an arbitration agreement was enforceable,
even though the plaintiffs showed the waiver effectively prevented them
from bringing a federal antitrust claim, since the litigation of the claim
would be prohibitively expensive.18 In most domestic cases, the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which provides for judicial facilitation of private dispute resolution through arbitration, controls contracts executed
under federal and state law.19 However, due to the sovereign nature of
Native American tribes in the United States, the enforcement of arbitration clauses has not been a smooth road.

Id. at 221; see Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Fair Play: Perspectives From AAA On
Consumer and Employment Arbitration 7 n.2 (2002).
15
In April of 2012, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau launched a public
inquiry into arbitration clauses and how consumers and financial services companies
are affected by them. See CFPB Launches Public Inquiry into Arbitration Clauses,
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.
gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-public-inquiry-intoarbitration-clauses/.
16
See Comment, Enforceable or Not?, supra note 10, at 222 (citing Eric Berkowitz,
Is Justice Served?, L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 2006, at 20).
17
Id.
18
See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); see also
Class Actions—Class Arbitration Waivers—American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 278 (2013).
19
See 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2014); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)
(holding that the Federal Arbitration Act applied to contracts executed under state law).
14

146

THE ARBITRATION BRIEF

Volume 4

Under the FAA, arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.”20 This provision “permits agreements to
arbitration to be invalidated by generally applicable contract defenses,
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,” provided those defenses do
not “apply only to arbitration or . . . derive their meaning from the fact
that an agreement to arbitration is at issue.”21 Unconscionability may be
procedural or substantive:
Procedural unconscionability consists of some impropriety during the process of forming the contract depriving
a party of meaningful choice. . . . Factors to be considered in determining whether an agreement is procedurally unconscionable include whether each party had
the opportunity to understand the terms of the contract,
whether important terms were hidden in a maze of fine
print, and all of the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract. . . . Substantive unconscionability
concerns the actual terms of the contract and examines
the relative fairness of the obligations assumed, asking whether the terms are so onesided as to oppress or
unfairly surprise an innocent party.22
Concern over unconscionability remains one of the most significant arguments against binding arbitration clauses; in particular forum
selection clauses in which the chosen “forum” is distant and the legal
proceedings would be foreign. This concern has become more prevalent
in financial services contracts, specifically payday lending, as will be
further discussed below.
b. Sovereign Immunity of Tribes
One of the main roadblocks to arbitration is sovereign immunity;
since if it is left intact through the lack of a waiver, a federal or state
court lacks the power to hear or decide the litigation. Tribal sovereign
immunity is a judicially created doctrine which first came to light in
1940, when the U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. United States
Fidelity & Guarantee Co., held that Native American tribes retain an

20
21
22

9 U.S.C. § 2.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011).
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Rosen, 949 N.E.2d 639, 647 (Ill. 2011).
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inherent right to claim tribal sovereign immunity,23 including suit from
states.24 In the past seventy years, the Court has continued to expand
and hold that suits against tribes are barred “absent a clear waiver by the
tribe or congressional abrogation” and that the waiver of tribal immunity
“cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.”25 In Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Court explicitly stated “Indian tribes have
long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from
suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”26
Although the federal government, foreign nations, and states have
sovereign immunity in principle, tribal sovereign immunity is unique
since many states have waived immunity when the government is
involved in a proprietary or commercial activity. 27 The federal government’s immunity is similar because the immunity is not limited to the
tribe’s governmental functions, but it also applies to commercial and
proprietary tribal government functions.28 Tribal immunity’s roots can
be found in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, where the U.S. Supreme Court
held that Native American tribes within the United States are “not foreign state[s] in the sense of the Constitution” but are “domestic dependent nations.”29
Given the unique nature of tribal sovereign immunity, there are two
main reasons it exists: (1) the need to protect the economic viability of

See 309 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1940); see also Brian C. Lake, The Unlimited Sovereign
Immunity of Indian Businesses Operating Outside the Reservation: An Idea Whose
Time Has Gone, 1996 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 87, 89 (1996).
24
See Three Affiliated Tribes v. World Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986) (holding that
states may not infringe upon the sovereign immunity of Native American tribes).
25
See Okla. Tax Comm. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509
(1991).
26
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
27
See William V. Vetter, Doing Business with Indians and the Three “S”es:
Secretarial Approval, Sovereign Immunity, and Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. L.
REV. 169, 173 (1994) (noting that tribal immunity is broader than state immunity since
many states do not recognize or waive immunity in situations when the government is
involved in a proprietary or commercial activity).
28
Id. The United States is immune from suits unless it has waived immunity, through
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674, and the Tucker Act, 27 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(a), 1491, or has consented to the suit.
29
30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831).
23
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the tribes and (2) recognition of their status as separate sovereigns.30
Regarding the first factor, the Eighth Circuit wisely stated that “[a]s rich
as the . . . Nation is to be in lands and money, it would soon be impoverished if it was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts, and required
to respond to all the demands which parties chose to prefer against
it.”31 The recognition of sovereignty is vital and, since the arrival of the
Europeans and the creation of the United States, the United States has
treated and recognized Native American tribes as sovereigns and negotiated with their representatives.32 The Eighth Circuit also stated that “[i]
t has been the policy of the United States to place and maintain the . . .
Nation and other civilized Indian Nations in the Indian Territory, so far
as relates to suits against them, on the plane of independent states.”33
Another difficulty with tribal sovereign immunity is determining
if a commercial entity is separate from the Native American tribe. An
entity that “ha[s] a distinct, nongovernmental character” is not immune,
but an entity that is “merely an administrative convenience, i.e., a ‘subordinate [tribal] economic organization’” is immune.34 Lower courts
have looked to numerous factors to determine if an entity is subordinate
to the tribal government, including: (1) if the entity is organized under
tribal constitution or laws (rather than federal law); (2) if the organization’s purpose(s) are similar to a tribal government’s (e.g., promoting
tribal welfare, alleviating unemployment, providing money for tribal
programs); (3) if the organization’s managing body is necessarily composed primarily of tribal officials (e.g., organization’s board is, by law,
controlled by tribal council members); (4) if the tribe’s governing body
has the unrestricted power to dismiss members of the organization’s
governing body; (5) if the organization (and/or its governing body)
“acts for the tribe” in managing organization’s activities; (6) if the tribe
is the legal owner of property used by the organization, with title held in
See Alexander Hogan, Protecting Native American Communities by Preserving
Sovereign Immunity and Determining the Place of Tribal Businesses in the Federal
Bankruptcy Code, 43 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 569, 572 (2011-12) (discussing the
historical reasoning for tribal sovereign immunity).
31
Id.; Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1895).
32
See David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, Robert A. Williams, Jr., & Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Introduction: Indians and Indian Law, Cases & Materials on Federal
Indian Law 2 (2011).
33
See Hogan, supra note 29, at 572; Thebo, 66 F. at 375.
34
See Vetter, supra note 26, at 176 (discussing the difficulty of determining if an
entity is separate or connected to a Native American tribe).
30
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the tribe’s name; (7) if the organization’s administrative and/or accounting activities are controlled or exercised by tribal officials; and (8) if
the organization’s activities take place primarily on the reservation.35
It is important to note that these are simply the factors that the courts
examine, but not all are necessary to find an entity subordinate of the
tribal government.36
The final issue lies in determining if the activity took place in
“Indian country.” Although 18 U.S.C. § 1151 is a criminal statute, it
“generally applies to questions of civil jurisdiction.”37 18 U.S.C. § 1151
defines “Indian country” as:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and
1156 of this title, the term “Indian country,” as used in
this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through
the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within
the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof,
and whether within or without the limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have
not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.38
In the early 1990s, the Court held that “dependent Indian communities” include any “area . . . validly set apart for the use of Indians as
such, under the superintendence of the Government,”39 and recognized
Vetter, supra note 26, at 177 (citing Dixon v. Picopa Const. Co., 772 P.2d 1104
(Ariz. 1989); Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 720 P.2d 499 (Ariz.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz.,
696 P.2d 223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); S. Unique, Ltd. v. Gila River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Cmty., 674 P.2d 1376 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984), review denied (1984); White
Mountain Apache Indian Tribe v. Shelley, 480 P.2d 654 (Ariz. 1971); Morgan v. Colo.
River Indian Tribe, 443 P.2d 421 (Ariz. 1968)).
36
Vetter, supra note 26, at 177.
37
Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998) (“Although
[the statute] by its terms relates only to . . . criminal jurisdiction, . . . it also generally
applies to questions of civil jurisdiction . . . .”); see also William Wood, It Wasn’t an
Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1589 n.4
(2013) (discussing the distinction between what is “Indian country” and what is not).
38
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2013).
39
See Okla. Tax Comm. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. at 511.
35
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that Congress intended to eschew technical distinctions in land tenure
and “defined Indian country broadly, . . . [intending] to designate as
Indian country all lands set aside by whatever means for the residence
of tribal Indians under federal protection, together with trust and
restricted Indian allotments.”40 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit determined a tribal housing project was a “dependent Indian community,”
and articulated a test to determine if a particular area is a “dependent
Indian community.”41
Under Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, “a waiver of sovereign
immunity ‘cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed.”42
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a special mode of statutory
construction when a statute affects Native American interests, and in
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians the Court held that “statutes are
to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.”43 Courts use this method of statutory
interpretation to determine whether a statute has waived a tribe’s sovereign immunity, and courts have only found a waiver when Congress has
explicitly stated that the statute is meant to remove tribal immunity.44
Although the concept of tribal sovereign immunity is similar
to that of the immunity afforded to the federal government, to state
Okla. Tax Comm. v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125 (1993) (citing Felix
Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 34 (1982 ed.)).
41
See United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied
459 U.S. 823 (1982). The test articulated by the Eighth Circuit includes looking at
several factors: (1) whether the U.S. has retained “title to the lands which it permits
the Indians to occupy” and “authority to enact regulations and protective laws
respecting this territory”; (2) “the nature of the area in question, the relationship of
the inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes and to the federal government, and the
established practice of government agencies towards the area”; (3) whether there is
“an element of cohesiveness . . . manifested either by economic pursuits in the area,
common interest, or needs of the inhabitants as supplied by that locality”; and (4)
“whether such lands have been set apart for the use, occupancy, and protection of
dependent Indian peoples.” Id. at 839.
42
See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 (holding that suits against a tribe under
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 are barred by the tribe’s sovereign immunity since
nothing on the face of ICRA purported to subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the
federal courts).
43
471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
44
See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 60 (“Although Congress clearly has power
to authorize civil actions against tribal officers . . . a proper respect both for tribal
sovereignty and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions that we
tread lightly in the absence of clear indication of legislative intent”).
40
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governments, and to foreign nations, tribal sovereign immunity is much
broader. Under the Tucker Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act, the
federal government has waived immunity from tort liability and from
liability arising out of its commercial activities.45 Although the federal
government cannot limit state sovereign immunity,46 many states have
waived immunity in a manner similar to the federal government in the
Federal Tort Claims Act,47 and states are subject to suit by both the
federal government and by other states. Furthermore, foreign states no
longer have immunity for commercial activities in the United States due
to the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.48 However, tribal sovereign immunity still remains in most circumstances,49 but there are some
indications of limitations to come under the strong dissents of Justices

See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(Tucker Act of 1887) (2014) (providing
federal jurisdiction for a variety of non-tort claims against the United States); 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (Federal Tort Claims Act of 1947) (West 2014) (provides
government damage liability for acts by the United States or its employees for any
“negligent or wrongful acts or omissions . . . in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances.”).
46
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment
re-affirms that states possess sovereign immunity and, thus, are generally immune
from being sued in federal court without waiving that immunity); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution does not provide
Congress with the ability to subject a state, without their consent, to private suits for
damages in state court); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding
that the Eleventh Amendment precludes Congress from abrogating state sovereign
immunity in the federal courts pursuant to any of its Article I powers); see also Coll.
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 684-86
(1999) (declining to limit state sovereign immunity to non-commercial activities and
suggesting that Congress might also lack the authority to do so).
47
See State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability, National Conference of
State Legislatures (Sept, 8, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/
state-sovereign-immunity-and-tort-liability.aspx (providing a table of statutes and
constitutional provisions for all 50 states and the District of Columbia related to
sovereign immunity and tort claims against the state); see generally Jonathan R. Siegel,
Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the Eleventh Amendment, 52
Duke L.J. 1167 (2003) (discussing waivers of sovereign immunity by states).
48
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2011).
49
See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757-59 (noting the restrictions on tribal immunity “in
limited circumstances” by Congress, including mandatory liability insurance under
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.S. § 450f(c)(3)
(2011), gaming activities under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, § 2710(d)(7)(A)
(ii) (2011), etc.).
45
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Ginsburg, Thomas, and Ginsburg in the recent decision of Michigan v.
Bay Mills Indian Community.50
c. Jurisdiction
In addition to the concern about sovereign immunity, there is a question as to whether the tribal arbitration tribunals/courts are the proper
jurisdiction. The first Supreme Court case to deal with civil jurisdiction by tribal courts against non-tribal members was Williams v. Lee in
1959.51 The Court held that a state court did not have jurisdiction to try
a civil case between a non-Native American who was doing business
on the reservation with tribal members who reside on the reservation,
and that the tribal court would be the proper tribunal.52 The Court noted
that “absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Native
Americans to make their own laws and be ruled by them,”53 and that
prior Supreme Court decisions “have consistently guarded the authority
of Indian governments over their reservations . . . . If this power is to be
taken from them, it is for Congress to do it.”54 Although the court made
See 132 S. Ct. 2024, 2045, 2054 (2014) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Kiowa decision, which extended tribal sovereign immunity to bar suits “arising
out of an Indian tribe’s commercial activities conducted outside its territory,” was an
“error” and should be overturned. “That decision, wrong to beginning with, has only
worsened with the passage of time. In the 16 years since Kiowa, tribal commerce
has proliferated and the inequalities engendered by unwarranted tribal immunity have
multiplied.” Furthermore, Justice Thomas notes that “[i]n Kiowa, this Court adopted
a rule without a reason: a sweeping immunity from suit untethered from commercial
realities and the usual justifications for immunity, premised on the misguided notion
that only Congress can place sensible limits on a doctrine we created. The decision was
mistaken then, and the Court’s decision to reaffirm it in the face of the unfairness and
conflict it has endangered it doubly so.”); 132 S. Ct. 2024, 2054 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (reaffirming her decision to join in Justice Steven’s dissenting opinion in
Kiowa and stating that “this Court’s declaration of an immunity thus absolute was and
remains exorbitant.”); 132 S. Ct. 2024, 2045 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I am now
convinced that Kiowa was wrongly decided; that, in the intervening 16 years, its error
has grown more glaringly obvious . . . .”).
51
358 U.S. 217 (1959).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 220.
54
Id. at 223 (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-66 (1903)); see
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387 (1976) (stating that state court jurisdiction
“plainly would interfere with the powers of self-government exercised by the tribe
through its own tribal courts”).
50
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it very clear that tribal courts had civil jurisdiction in cases involving
tribal members, it was not until the 1980’s that the court began to clearly
address the civil jurisdiction question for suits against non-Native
Americans.55
It was not until the end of the twentieth century and into the twentyfirst century that the Court addressed cases involving non-Native
Americans that took place “off-reservation.” In Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
the Court addressed the adjudicatory authority of tribal courts over
personal injury actions against non-Native Americans, and it held that
there was no jurisdiction due to the lack of a consensual relationship56
and the fact that the incident did not occur on tribal lands.57 The general
rule is that, absent congressional action, tribes lack civil authority over
the conduct of non-members on non-Indian land within a reservation.58
Furthermore, in 2001, in Nevada v. Hicks, the Court held that tribal
See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 417 U.S. 845 (1985)
(distinguishing civil cases from Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978), which held that tribal courts didn’t have inherent criminal jurisdiction to
try and punish non-Native Americans (even if the criminal acts took place on the
reservation) unless Congress authorized it, and required that each assertion of tribal
civil jurisdiction should be reviewed, in the first instance, by the tribal court itself,
and that the parties must exhaust all tribal courts before appealing to the federal
courts.); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (extending Nat’l Farmers
to cases involving federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship). However, if
the reservation is located within one of the six states (Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oregon,
California, Nevada, and Alaska) that has received congressional authority to assume
state criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribal members under Public Law 280, 18
U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, and 25 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1326, and there is consent
by the tribe, the state law will apply, unless it is “regulatory,” which many consumer
protection laws are. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm., 411 U.S. 164, 177
(1973); see also Cal. v. Carbazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
56
See Montana v. United States, 544, 565-66 (1981) (holding that tribes only had
the power to regulate non-Native American on “Indian land” in two circumstances:
(1) regulatory authority over “taxation, licensing, or other means, and the activities
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements”; and (2) when
the conduct of the non-Native Americans on the reservation “threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.”).
57
See 520 U.S. 438, 460 (1997); see also Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) (holding that a tribal court didn’t have
jurisdiction to adjudicate a discrimination claim concerning the non-Native American
bank’s sale of fee-land (on a reservation) owned by the bank).
58
Id.
55
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courts do not have jurisdiction over civil claims against state officials
who entered tribal land to execute a search warrant against tribal members suspected of having violated state law off of the reservation, since
it was not “essential to tribal self-government or internal relations,” and
thus not an intrusion on the sovereignty of the Native American tribe.59
II. Current Status of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, Use of
Arbitration Clauses, Business Concerns, and Recent Litigation
involving Payday Loans and Native Americans
In the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has decided two
major cases involving sovereign immunity, arbitration clauses, and
Native American tribes: Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc. and C & L Enterprises v. Citizen Band, Potawatomi
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma.
In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v.
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. upheld a sovereign immunity defense
by a Native American tribe for breach of contract involving a business located off of the reservation.60 In this case, a tribal entity (the
Kiowa Industrial Development Commission) agreed to purchase stock
from Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., and the then-chairman of the
Kiowa’s business committee signed a promissory note in the name of
the Tribe to Manufacturing Technologies Inc.61 The note did not specify
governing law, but was signed on land held in trust for the tribe.62 It was
delivered outside of tribal land and obligated the Tribe to make payments in Oklahoma City.63 The note specifically stated that “[n]othing
in this Note subjects or limits the sovereign rights of the Kiowa Tribe
. . . ,”64 which clearly was not a waiver of sovereign immunity.65 The
Tribe defaulted and Manufacturing Technologies sued on the note in
state court, but the Tribe invoked sovereign immunity.66

See 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001).
Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 753.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 754.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Robert J. Miller, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
COUNTRY 99 (2012) (discussing the implications of Kiowa Tribe’s holding).
66
Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754.
59
60
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When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court held that “an
Indian tribe is not subject to suit in a state court—even for breach of contract involving off-reservation commercial conduct—unless “Congress
has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.”67 The Court
stated that “[a]s a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit
only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its
immunity.”68 The Court noted that precedent has not made the distinction
based on where the tribal activity occurred (on or off the reservation),69
or a distinction between governmental and commercial activities of the
tribe.70 Although the Court has recognized that a state may have authority
to tax or regulate tribal activities occurring within the state but outside
Indian country,71 “to say substantive state laws apply to off-reservation
conduct, however, is not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity
from suit.”72 The Court held that Native American tribes have sovereign
immunity from civil lawsuits on contracts, regardless if they involved
governmental or commercial activities, and whether or not they are
signed in “Indian country.”73 Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg
dissented, arguing since tribal immunity arose by “accident” and was
unjust,74 it should be limited to on-reservation activities with a “meaningful nexus” to a tribe’s “sovereign function.”75 Although the Court
noted the doctrine of sovereign immunity for Native American tribes

Id. at 754.
Id. at 754; see, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation, 476 U.S.
at 890; Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58; U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 512.
69
See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 167, 168, 172
(1977) (holding that the Tribe’s claim of immunity was “well founded,” and did not
discuss the relevance of if the fishing had taken place on or off the reservation).
70
See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 433 U.S. 165 (recognizing tribal immunity for
fishing, which may well be a commercial activity); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S.
506 (recognizing tribal immunity for coal-mining lease).
71
See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973).
72
Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 755.
73
Id. at 753; see also Miller, supra note 64, at 99.
74
Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 761, 766 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75
Id. at 764 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67
68
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arose “almost by accident”76 and had been adopted “with little analysis”
and “without extensive reasoning” in its earlier cases, it still remains the
law today, and outside investors must “protect themselves” by utilizing
due diligence in negotiation by demanding immunity waiver clauses.77
Contrary to the “pro-Native American” decision in Kiowa Tribe, in
2001 the Court held that a tribe had waived its sovereign immunity from
suit when it “expressly agreed” to arbitrate suits with the contractor, to
the governance of state law, and to the enforcement of arbitral awards.78
The case arose after the Citizen Band, Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma, a federally recognized tribe, solicited and retained a different roofing company after deciding to change the roofing material for
a contract on a building which was owned by the tribe, but not located
on the reservation, nor was it trust land.79 The initial contractor had the
tribe sign a standard form contract which contained an arbitration clause
that provided that disputes would be decided by arbitration, decisions by
the arbitrator would be final, and judgment would be enforceable; and
a choice of law clause providing that the contract would be governed
by the law of the place where the project was located, which would be
Oklahoma state law, not tribal law.80
The question presented to the Court was “whether the Tribe waived
its immunity from suit in state court when it expressly agreed to arbitrate disputes with C & L relating to the contract, to the governance of
Oklahoma law, and to the enforcement of arbitral awards ‘in any court

Id. at 756, 763 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concurring with the majority on this point);
see Wood, supra note 36, at 1593 (discussing the Court’s use, and misunderstanding,
of Tuner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919), in Kiowa, particular the statement
describing Turner as “a slender reed for supporting the principle of tribal sovereign
immunity” since the Turner Court assumed tribal immunity for the sake of argument
rather than as a “reasoned statement of doctrine.”).
77
Id. at 756, 753, 757; see Wood, supra note 36, at 1589, 1593-94 (arguing that
the Court misunderstood and mischaracterized the history of sovereign immunity in
respect to Native American tribes; in particular the Kiowa Court ignored two Eighth
Circuit cases used in U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, of Adams v. Murphy, 165 F.
304, 308-09 (8th Cir. 1908) and Thebo, 66 F. 372, and the 1850 Supreme Court case of
Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. 362, 374 (1850), which applied sovereign immunity principles
to uphold dismissal of a suit against the Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation.);
Miller, supra note 64, at 99.
78
C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 414.
79
Id. at 414-15.
80
Id. at 415.
76

2014 The Current State Of Arbitration Clauses Within Native American Tribal Contracts: 157
An Examination Of Binding Arbitration Contracts in Native American Payday Lending

having jurisdiction thereof.’”81 The Court first noted that for a tribe to
relinquish its immunity, its renouncement must be “clear.”82 In this case,
the waiver—an agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, to be bound
by the arbitration award, and to have the award enforced in any court of
law—was unambiguous and explicit.83 The arbitration clause in this case
had three elements: an agreement to arbitrate all disputes, an agreement
to be bound by any arbitration award, and an agreement that any award
could be enforced in any state or federal court with jurisdiction.84 The
Tribe argued that that since the contract did not specify a specific judicial forum in which to enforce the decision of the arbitrator, sovereign
immunity was not waived.85 However, the Court rejected this argument,
holding that the consent to arbitration via the contract, “memorialize[d]
the Tribe’s commitment to adhere to the contract’s dispute resolution
regime,” and thus was a waiver of sovereign immunity.86 Therefore, “[a]
ny deviation from this language in C & L Enterprises could engender
an argument that the case is distinguishable.”87 Furthermore, the “Court
expressly noted that attempting to hide behind sovereign immunity
principles under the circumstances equated to a ‘game lacking practical consequences.’”88 The Court held that “by the clear import of the
arbitration clause, the Tribe is amenable to a state-court suit to enforce
an arbitral award in favor of contractor C & L.”89
Prior to the Supreme Court cases, there were numerous state and
circuit court cases involving arbitration clauses and Native American
tribes. In Calvello v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, the South Dakota Supreme
Court held that the tribe’s participation in arbitration did not amount
Id.
Id. at 418.
83
Id. at 420.
84
Id. at 415.
85
Id. at 421; see also Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State v. Cnty. of Oneida, 802
F. Supp. 2d 395, 417 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (distinguishing C & L Enters. from the case
presented).
86
C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 422.
87
See Edward Rubacha, Contract Forms and Contract Drafting: Construction
Contracts with Indian Tribes or on Tribal Lands, CONSTRUCTION L. 12, 13 (2006)
(discussing the Court’s holding in C & L Enters.).
88
See Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier & Metchi Palaniappan, Intersection of Corporate
America and Indian Country: Negotiating Successful Business Alliances, 22 T. M.
COOLEY L. REV. 566, 577 (2005) (discussing the trend by courts to erode sovereign
immunity for tribes); C & L Enters., 532 U.S. AT 422.
89
C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 414.
81
82
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to a waiver of its sovereign immunity in a contract dispute with one
of its non-tribal employees.90 Similarly, in Tamiami Partners, Limited
v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, the Eleventh Circuit upheld
sovereign immunity to protect the tribe from litigation.91 The Eighth
Circuit, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Construction Co., held that the
tribe expressly waived its sovereign immunity with respect to an arbitration provision in a construction contract.92 Furthermore, in Val/Del. Inc.
v. Pascua Yaqui Tribe, an Arizona Appellate Court held that an arbitration provision, in a contract with a management company to finance and
operate the Tribe’s bingo operation, constituted a clear indication that
sovereign immunity had been waived, thus jurisdiction was concurrent
in the state court and in the tribal court.93
For an arbitration clause to be enforceable, the tribe must have
relinquished its sovereign immunity by executing a waiver.94 A waiver
of sovereign immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally
expressed,”95 but the use of talismanic words, such as “sovereign immunity,” is not needed for a waiver to be valid.96 Courts, in determining
whether a tribe has relinquished its protection with sufficient clarity,
have inquired “whether the language of [the operative agreement or
clause] might have hoodwinked an unsophisticated Indian negotiator
into giving up the tribe’s immunity from suit without realizing that he
was doing so.”97 To determine whether an agreement is sufficiently
See 584 N.W.2d 108 (S.D. 1998); see also Heath Oberloch, Calvello v. Yankton
Sioux Tribe: Shoring Up Tribal Sovereign Immunity Against the Flood of Commercial
Transactions Involving Tribally Owned Businesses, 44 S.D. L. REV. 746, 746 (1999)
(examining the holding of Calvello).
91
177 F.3d 1212, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 1999); see also David D. Haddock & Robert
J. Miller, Sovereignty Can be a Liability: How Tribes Can Mitigate the Sovereign’s
Paradox, in SELF-DETERMINATION: THE OTHER PATH FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 194, 205-06
(Terry L. Anderson, Bruce L. Benson, & Thomas E. Flanagan, eds., 2006).
92
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Const. Co., 50 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1995).
93
145 Ariz. 558, 565 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
94
Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754.
95
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 458.
96
C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 420; see also Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 50 F.3d at 563 (“[W]
hile the Supreme Court has expressed its protectiveness of tribal sovereign immunity
by requiring that any waiver be explicit, it has never required the invocation of magic
words stating that the tribe hereby waives its sovereign immunity.”).
97
Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., Inc., 86 F.3d
656, 660 (7th Cir. 1996); see Rubacha, supra note 86, at 12 (discussing the issue in
determining if a tribe has relinquished its sovereign immunity protection).
90
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“clear” requires courts to take “a practical, commonsense approach in
attempting to separate words that fairly can be construed as compromising a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity from words that fall short.”98
Basically, “the cases require that waiver be found when expressed in a
way that could not unfairly surprise a tribe.”99 Therefore, for a tribe to be
subject to mandatory arbitration clauses, the waiver of sovereign immunity must be so obvious that the tribe could not be surprised. However,
unlike the waiver of sovereign immunity, a tribe, as a commercial entity,
does not have to make the mandatory arbitration clause obvious to the
public.
a. Use of Arbitration Clauses and Forum-Selection
Clauses Today
Arbitration clauses are standard within American consumer agreements: from cell phones, to credit cards, to mortgages, all include, in
the small print, the waiver of the right to litigation and the agreement
to mandatory and binding arbitration.100 The percentage of arbitration
clause in consumer product contracts appears to be increasing, with one
study finding that 76.9% of consumer contracts studied included arbitration clauses, and “every consumer contract with an arbitration clause

Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuch Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21,
31 (1st Cir. 2000).
99
Rubacha, supra note 86, at 12.
100
See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, & Emily Sherwin, Arbitrations’
Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and
Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 871 (2007-2008) (discussing the
rise in arbitration clauses in consumer contracts); see, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (permitting contracts that exclude class action
arbitration in a cell phone contract), Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133
S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (holding that class action waivers in arbitration agreements (for
credit cards) will be strictly enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act, even when
it is not economically feasible for individual plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims); see
also Nitro-Lift Tech., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (reversing Oklahoma’s
Supreme Court decision that prevented arbitration of a dispute over a non-competition
agreement in employment contracts), Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 131 S.
Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that West Virginia’s categorical prohibition of pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful death claims against nursing
homes is contrary to the terms and coverage of the Federal Arbitration Act).
98
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also included a waiver of class-wide arbitration.”101 In the past few years
there has been an increase in media attention and criticism regarding
mandatory arbitration clauses, in particular those which are related
to financial services products, and it is very likely that the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau will begin to crack down on arbitration
clauses.102 As with many things, there are both positive aspects and criticisms regarding the use of arbitration clauses. On a positive note, they
allow companies to save money while reducing the cost of products
to consumers due to the decrease likelihood of litigation.103 However,
there are far more criticisms regarding the use of mandatory arbitration
clauses, including the unfairness imposed by economically powerful
corporations on the unsophisticated consumers who must unwillingly
consent, the deprivation of jury trials, and the lower damage awards,
even though this has not been proven.104 Critics also argue that mandatory arbitration is detrimental to the public interest, which supports
See Eisenberg et al., supra note 99, at 883 table 2, 881, 884 (sample consisted of
twenty-six consumer agreements drafted by twenty-one companies, including three
commercial banks (five consumer agreements), two credit card issuers (two consumer
agreements), and one financial credit company (one consumer agreement)); see
also Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 64 (2004) (this study found that 69.2% of the consumer financial
contracts in their sample included arbitration clauses and included tax preparation and
investment contracts, in addition to credit card and banking contracts, as consumer
financial contracts, and if limited to credit card and banking contracts, twelve of
seventeen, or 70.6%, included arbitration clauses).
102
See Rachel Witkowski, CFPB Likely to Crack Down on Arbitration Clauses,
AMERICAN BANKER (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_237/
cfpb-likely-to-crack-down-on-arbitration-clauses-1064229-1.html.
103
Eisenberg et al., supra note 99, at 872; see Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price
of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP.
RESOL. 89, 90 (2001) (noting a variety of ways in which arbitration reduces the cost
of dispute resolution for companies, including: (1) high damages are less likely due
to the lack of juries, (2) defendant companies avoid bad publicity, (3) procedures are
nationally uniform, (4) the finality of arbitration saves companies the potential cost of
appeal, (5) eliminates the possibility of class action, (6) deters claims against business
by requiring consumer-plaintiffs to pay arbitrator fees, as well as filing fees that exceed
the filing fees in litigation, and (7) discovery and appeals are limited).
104
Eisenberg et al., supra note 99, at 872-83; see Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth
Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison,
58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44 (Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004) (determining that there is no significant
difference between arbitration and litigation awards).
101
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transparency in legal resolutions, and that the prohibition on class
actions which are put forward by many contracts preventing the necessary appraisal by consumers of corporate malfeasance, make litigating
small claims economically viable, and to hold companies accountable
for wrongdoing.105
Most recently, there has been an increase in criticism and concern
regarding mandatory arbitration clauses in financial services contracts
with Native Americans and non-Native Americans. On December 12,
2013, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)106 released
the preliminary results of the much-anticipated study of pre-dispute
arbitration contract provisions in financial products/services.107 Not
surprisingly, the CFPB’s study of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) filings about credit cards, checking accounts, payday loans, and
prepaid cards between 2010 and 2012 found less than 1,250 consumer
arbitrations (most concerned with debt collection). Approximately 900
consumer arbitrations were filed by consumers, compared to over 3,000
cases involving credit card issues alone filed in federal court, with more
than 400 filed as class action.108
Although the CFPB study examined credit cards, checking accounts,
payday loans, and prepaid cards, the recent litigation concerning Native
Americans involves only payday lending. Payday lending is rampant in
the United States, with two million households, and up to twelve million

Eisenberg et al., supra note 99, at 874.
See About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.
consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (The CFPB is an independent federal agency,
created in 2011 under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, which is responsible for regulating consumer protection for financial services and
products in the United States.).
107
See Arbitration Study Preliminary Results: Section 1028(a) Study Results to Date,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Dec. 12, 2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/201312_cfpb_arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf.
108
Id.; see CFPB Finds Few Consumer File Arbitration Cases, Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/the-cfpb-findsfew-consumers-file-arbitration-cases/ (Indicating large banks prefer arbitration clauses
over class actions.).
105
106
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individuals in 2010 using them annually.109 An average of eight loans
in the amount of $375 are taken annually, resulting in a $520 interest
payment.110 It is important to remember that legitimate short-term consumer loans, such as payday loans, are the most attractive credit option
for the unbanked and underbanked.111 The CFPB study determined that,
unlike for credit cards, there was an annual average of forty-six payday
loan arbitration filings, with forty-four filed by consumers, and only one
involving debt collection.112 Most of the arbitration claims invoked state
statutory claims (90%), contract claims (83%), fraud claims (75%), and
tort claims (61%), but also included federal statutory claims (28%),
Credit Repair Organization Act113 (14%), Truth in Lending Act114 (7%),

See Addendum to the 2011 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked
Households Use of Alternative Financial Services, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 48
(2013) available at http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2013_AFSAddendum_
web.pdf; see also Who Borrows, Where They Borrow, and Why: Payday Lending in
America, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 4 (2012), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Safe_Small_Dollar_Loans/LOANS_
Payday%20Lending%20Report%20Final_web.pdf (finding that 5.5% of adults in the
United States have used a payday loan in the past five years, with three-quarters using
storefront lenders and approximately one-quarter using the internet)
110
See Who Borrows, Where They Borrow, and Why, supra note 108, at 4.
111
See Robert Rosette & Saba Bazzazieh, Arizona’s Win-Win Short-Term Credit
Solution: Assisting Arizona’s Unbanked and Underbanked While Supporting Tribal
Self-Determination, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 781, 784 (2013).
112
See Arbitration Study Preliminary Results, supra note 106, at 12, 13 n. 25.
113
15 U.S.C. § 1679 et seq. (2011). The Credit Repair Organizations Act (“CROA”),
which is part of Title IV of the Consumer Protection Act, was enacted to “ensure that
prospective buyers of the services of credit repair organizations are provided with the
information necessary to make an informed decision regarding the purchase of such
services” and to “protect the public from unfair or deceptive advertising and business
practices by credit repair organizations.” Id. at § 1679(b).
114
15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2011). The Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), which
was enacted on May 29, 1968, was created to promote informed use of consumer
credit, in particular, by requiring disclosures about its terms and costs to standardize
the manner in which costs associated with borrowing are calculated and disclosed.
See generally CFPB Consumer Laws and Regulations: Truth in Lending, CONSUMER
FINANCE PROTECTION BUREAU (June 2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/201306_cfpb_laws-and-regulations_tila-combined-june-2013.pdf.
109
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refutation of alleged debt (7%), and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act115
(6%).116 Furthermore, the study found that nine out of ten arbitration
clauses expressly bar consumers from filing class arbitration, consumers prefer arbitration over class action settlements, arbitrations are not
filed by consumers for small-dollar disputes, and few consumers file
small claims court actions.117
Like many business contracts today, Native American tribes and
tribal entities118 utilize mandatory arbitration contracts within the contracts they write, and sometimes must waive sovereign immunity and
are subject to arbitration. However, unlike the federal government and
states, most tribes do not waive sovereign immunity in such a sweeping nature.119 Despite financial pressure, most tribes have chosen not to
waive their sovereign immunity in commercial dealings.120 One reason
for this is the existence of informational imbalances between tribes
and their business partners.If a business partner is unaware that a tribe
or a commercial entity established by a tribe has immunity, then the
15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2011). The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which was
approved in September 1977, established the legal protection from abuse debt collection
practices and its purpose is to: (1) eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt
collectors, (2) to ensure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt
collection practices are not completely disadvantaged, and (3) to promote consistent
State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. Id. at § 1692(e).
116
See Arbitration Study Preliminary Results, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
supra note 106, at 87 figure 21.
117
See CFPB Finds Few Consumer File Arbitration Cases, Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, supra note 107.
118
Sovereign immunity extends to the activities of tribal entities since they are the
“economic arms” of the tribe itself and thus should be entitle to the same protections.
See Staudenmaier & Palaniappan, supra note 87, at 574-55; see also Weeks Constr.,
Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that, as
an arm of the tribal government, the tribal housing authority is extended the “attributed
of tribal sovereignty” [citing Dubrary v. Rosebud Hous. Auth., 565 F. Supp. 462, 46566 (D.S.D. 1983)], therefore, “suits against an agency . . . [are] barred absent a waiver
of sovereign immunity” [citing Wilson v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians,
459 F. Supp. 366, 368-69 (D.N.D. 1978]); Gayle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284,
287 (Min. 1996) (extending tribal sovereign immunity to tribal casinos); Sanchez v.
Santa Ana Golf Club, Inc., 104 P.3d 548, 554 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (extending tribal
immunity to a tribally-owned golf course); DeFeo v. Ski Apache Resort, 904 P.2d 1065,
1069 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (applying tribal immunity to ski resort owned by tribe).
119
See Hogan, supra note 29, at 576 (discussing the difference between tribal and
state sovereign immunity); see also Miller, supra note 64, at 97.
120
Lake, supra note 22, at 101.
115
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tribe can negotiate without informing the other party of the immunity
and retain the benefit of the immunity without sacrificing anything in
negotiations.121 However, if tribes waive their immunity, and thus are
subjected to arbitration, they do so on a case-by-case basis in contract
provisions.122
b. How Tribes/Tribal Courts Address Disputes, Awards & the
Appeals Process for Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
In the past century, Native American tribal courts have grown exponentially in number. Approximately 250 of the 563 federally recognized
tribes in the United States have a tribal court system.123 Unfortunately,
these tribal courts vary in their complexity and workload. For example,
the Navajo Nation’s judicial system decides thousands of cases a year
compared to other tribes with only part-time judges who hear only a
few cases a year.124 Furthermore, the different use of customary and
“American” law in these courts, in addition to the lack of separation
of powers,125 can make these tribal courts very difficult for outsiders to
understand both in procedure and in language used. Contrary to popular belief, tribal courts have been found to be quite fair to non-Native
Americans.126
Like American courts, many tribal courts have created their own
judicial system with extensive rules and procedures, such as the

Hogan, supra note 29, at 576; Lake, supra note 22, at 101-02 (arguing that tribes
have not waived their immunity in order to maintain information imbalances when
negotiating).
122
See Miller, supra note 64, at 97.
123
Id. at 106; see also Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development,
Choctaw Tribal Court System, TRIBAL GOVERNANCE SUCCESS STORIES: HONORING NATIONS
2005 (2006), http://hpaied.org/images/resources/publibrary/Choctaw%20Tribal%20
Court%20System.pdf (discussing the success of the Choctaw tribal court system).
124
See Miller, supra note 64, at 106.
125
See generally Stephen Cornell, Sovereignty, Prosperity and Policy in Indian
Country Today, 5 CMTY. REINVESTMENT 5, 5-7, 9-13 (1997)
126
See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty
Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM INDIAN L. REV. 285, 285-87, 351-52 (1998) (finding that,
after analyzing 85 cases in tribal courts, there is fairness towards non-Native American
litigants).
121
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Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the Navajo Nation.127 One major difference between tribal courts and the traditional American court is
the variety of qualifications required to be a judge; unlike American
courts, some tribal courts do not require law degrees while others do.128
Additionally, tribal laws, unlike American laws, may include traditional
practices that are through oral history, and are not codified.129 However,
similar to American courts, tribal courts follow procedural rules which
outline the adjudicatory authority and limitations of tribal jurisdiction.130
Furthermore, most tribal courts do follow precedent, sometimes from
other tribal courts, and frequently view federal and state court decisions
as persuasive authority, particularly in commercial litigation.131
Due to the independence of each tribe, it is difficult to generalize how
tribes address disputes, awards, and the appeals process.132 However, if
tribal law governs, which many of the new arbitration clauses state (and
are currently subject to litigation), prior to court proceedings, or engaging in dispute resolution, it is vital to undertake sufficient due diligence
in understanding the process and structure of the tribal courts. This is
usually done by reviewing the tribe’s constitution or other governance
documents, the tribal entity’s organizational or other governance documents, applicable tribal council resolutions, and other applicable and
relevant tribal laws, codes, and regulations.133 This is similar to the due
diligence that any attorney should conduct when working in a new jurisdiction. Overall, the individual nature of tribal courts makes it nearly

See Staudenmaier & Palaniappan, supra note 87, at 590; see also Mashantucket
Pequot Tribal Laws (2008), available at HTTP://WWW.MPTNLAW.COM/LAWS/TITLES%20
24%20-%20END.PDF and 7 NAVAJO NATION CODE TIT. 7 (1977) (EXPLAINING DIFFERENT
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS).
128
See Staudenmaier & Palaniappan, supra note 87, at 591; see Gordon K. Wright,
Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1401-02
(1985).
129
See Staudenmaier & Palaniappan, supra note 87, at 591.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 591-92; see Mamiye v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 1 Mash. 245,
247-49 (1996) (citing federal and Connecticut cases as persuasive authority). Most
state courts extend full faith and credit to tribal court orders, as do federal courts, who
generally grant comity to tribal judges’ rulings. See Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska,
944 F.2d 548, 555 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting the use of precedent by tribal courts).
132
See Staudenmaier & Palaniappan, supra note 87, at 592 (discussing the unique
nature of each tribes judicial and enforcement procedures).
133
Id.
127
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impossible to generalize, but a case-by-case analysis of each tribe is
possible and highly suggested prior to entering the tribal court.
c. Business Concerns
Native American businesses have untapped potential for economic
growth with the Native American gaming industry making over $26.2
billion in gross revenue in 2009 alone, along with $3.2 billion in related
hospitality and entertainment services.134 Native American gaming
is the most publicly seen aspect of tribal economic development, but
due to the fact that many reservations are not located near metropolitan areas or otherwise unable to participate in gaming, many tribes
have been forced to diversity their economic development, most often
through the internet.135 Native American tribes have moved into offering legitimate short-term consumer loans through tribally-regulated
and tribally-owned online short-term lending companies.136 There are
numerous business concerns regarding the use of mandatory arbitration
clauses, forum-selection clauses, and waivers of sovereign immunity,
when doing business with Native American tribes today. However, the
most prevalent concern, which must be settled prior to arbitration agreements, is the sovereign immunity of tribes and tribal entities.
As discussed above, tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from suit.
Tribal sovereign immunity exists for two reasons: the need to protect
the economic viability of the tribes, and to recognize their status as
separate sovereigns.137 However, there is an argument for eliminating
tribal immunity in that “immunity can actually harm tribal economies
if commercial partners are reluctant to deal with Indian entities whose

See NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INDIAN GAMING IN 2009
(2010), http://www.indiangaming.org/info/NIGA_2009_Economic_Impact_Report.
pdf (stating that the 237 Native American tribes, in 28 states, that are involved in the
gaming industry, provided $9.4 billion in federal taxes and revenue savings, in addition
to $2.4 billion in state taxes, revenue sharing, and regulatory payments). See also R.
Lance Boldrey & Jason Hanselman, Proceed with Prudence: Advising Clients Doing
Business in Indian Country, MICH. BAR. J. 34, 24 (Feb. 2010) (noting that with the
twelve federally recognized Native American tribes in Michigan there was an expected
$1.5 billion in revenue in 2010 alone).
135
See Rosette & Bazzazieh, supra note 110, at 800 (establishing the growth of the
tribal gaming industry).
136
Id. at 784.
137
Hogan, supra note 29, at 572 (explaining that many tribes depend on Indian
gaming revenues).
134
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status under the immunity doctrine may be unclear.”138 Furthermore, the
“primary threat immunity poses to tribal enterprises is the uncertainty
it creates between these enterprises and their business partners, particularly lenders.”139 This is due to the fact that if a court determines that
tribal sovereign immunity applies, then lenders cannot revert to their
typical means of recourse against defaulting borrows, i.e., creditors
cannot enforce judgments in their favor because courts have no authority to order the seizure of assets on tribal land for a creditor’s sale.140
Obstacles between business partners and tribes harm the economic
prospects of the tribe since as transaction costs increase, immunityrelated obstacles cause businesses to negotiate with and treat tribes
differently than other entities,141 and many potential business partners
are reluctant to deal with Native American tribes at all.142 There have
been numerous “horror stories” about tribes hiding behind sovereign
immunity in business disputes, including that of C & L Enterprises.143
Although these horror stories do exist, there are many examples of
successful business negotiations and partnerships between Native
American tribes and non-Native Americans.144 It is important to remember that tribes are not free from regulation when they conduct economic

Id. at 574.
Id. at 575.
140
Id.; Rubacha, supra note 86, at 16.
141
See David B. Jordan, Federal Indian Law: Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Why
Oklahoma Businesses Should Revamp Legal Relationships with Indian Tribes After
Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 52 OKLA. L. REV. 489, 504 (1999)
(arguing that immunity has hindered the economic interests of tribes and that immunity
results in resentment and missed opportunities for tribes).
142
See Hogan, supra note 29, at 575-76 (discussing the obstacles faced by business
partners and tribes).
143
See C & L Enter., 532 U.S. 411.
144
See Miller, supra note 64, at 98 (noting that, as of 2002, the Confederated Tribes
of the Siletz Indian Reservation in Oregon had approximate 275 contracts with various
business entities, and only 35 of them required waivers of sovereign immunity).
138
139
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activities off of the reservation.145 Additionally, even when tribal sovereign immunity is found to apply to a tribal entity, “tribal sovereign
is not absolute autonomy,” and tribes are not permitted “to operate in a
commercial capacity without legal constraints.”146
It is vital, both to the ability of tribes to conduct business and for
the protection of business interests by non-Native Americans, that
both parties conduct due diligence and carefully protect themselves by
obtaining adequate waivers of tribal sovereign immunity.147 Absent a
consensual waiver by the tribe, the only other way to obtain a waiver of
sovereign immunity is through Congress since the sovereignty of Native
American tribes “exists only at the sufferance of Congress,” which has

See Mescalero Apache Tribe, supra note 70, at 148-49 (noting that “[a]bsent
express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have
generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise applicable to
all citizens of the State.”); see, e.g., Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of Wash, 391
U.S. 392, 398 (1968) (holding that a treaty provision did not preclude the state from
regulating the manner of fishing and restricting commercial fishing in the interest of
conservation as long as the regulation was reasonable and a necessary exercise of the
state’s police power and did not discriminate against the Native Americans); Org. Vill.
of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1962) (holding that the state has the power to
regulate off-reservation fishing by Native Americans); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S.
681, 683 (1942) (holding that a state statute prescribing licensing fees for fishing is
invalid as applied to a Native American convicted of fishing without a license since the
treaty secured the exclusive right to take all fish in the water boarding the reservation);
Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575 (1928) (holding that the Secretary
of the Interior did not have the power, when the land was purchased for a Native
American with trust funds, to exempt it from state taxation); Ward v. Race Horse, 163
U.S. 504 (1896) (holding that a state had a right to regulate hunting off-reservation).
146
See, e.g., San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1314-15
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding the NLRB’s decision that National Labor Relations Act
applied to a Native American casino and that federal Indian law did not preclude this
since the operation of a casino is not a traditional attribute of self-government and
most of the employees and customers were not tribal members, nor did they live on the
reservation).
147
Miller, supra note 64, at 98.
145
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the power to modify or limit a tribes’ authority.148 “All aspects of Indian
sovereignty are subject to defeasance by Congress,”149 thus, Congress
has the power to waive tribes’ sovereign immunity rights. It is also very
important for outside businesses to include a clear forum selection
clause with an obvious forum selected.150 However, if there is a properly
constructed waiver of sovereign immunity and the arbitration clause is
fair to both parties, there is nothing for outside business to be concerned
about.
d. Recent Litigation Involving Payday Lending and Native
American Tribes
Recently there has been an increase of cases and enforcement
actions against tribes regarding payday lending. In State of Colorado v.
Cash Advance, the Colorado Supreme Court held that: (i) tribal immunity applies to administrative subpoenas directed at tribal commercial
activities conducted off of tribal lands; (ii) such immunity depends on
whether the entity is an “arm of the tribe”; (iii) officers of tribal entities are immune for acts within the scope of the their tribal authority;
and (iv) the state has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

See Staudenmaier & Palaniappan, supra note 87, at 578 (discussing congressional
waivers in regards to tribal sovereign immunity); United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment
did not bar the prosecution of a Native American in federal district court under the
Major Crimes Act, when he had previously been convicted in a tribal court of a lesser
included offense, since the power of a tribal court to punish a tribal offender is part
of the inherent tribal sovereignty, and not part of the federal government); see John F.
Petoskey, Doing Business with Michigan Indian Tribes, 76 Mich. B.J. 440, 442 (1997).
149
Escondidio Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765,
788 n.30 (1984).
150
See Boldrey & Hanselman, supra note 133, at 35.
148
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evidence that the tribal entities are not immune.151 Then in Missouri
v. Webb, the Missouri Attorney General brought suit against Payday
Financial, LLC, Western Sky Financial, LLC, and others in state court,
claiming that their Internet-based lending businesses violated Missouri
law.152 On March 27, 2012, after the defendants removed the case to
federal court, the district court remanded the case back to state court.153
The district court held that (1) sovereign immunity assertions do not
create a federal question for jurisdiction purposes; (2) forum selection
clauses provide no basis for federal jurisdiction; and (3) the individual
defendant’s tribal membership did not confer sovereign immunity on
him or on the defendant South Dakota LLC.154 Finally, in Maryland
Commissioner of Financial Regulation v. Western Sky Financial LLC,
the court held that it should abstain from interfering in Maryland’s
enforcement of its lending laws and rejected a dismissal request by the
payday lending company.155
In August of 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed and remanded the class action suit of Jackson v. Payday

Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State ex rel. Suthers, 242 P.3d 1099,
1102 (Colo. 2010). Previously, the court of appeals adopted an 11-part common law
test to determine when tribal business entities are considered arms of the tribe.” This
includes: (1) whether the entity is organized under the Tribes’ laws or constitutions; (2)
whether the purposes of the entity is similar to the Tribes’ purposes; (3) whether the
governing bodies the entity is composed predominantly of tribal officials; (4) whether
the Tribes have legal title to or own the property used by the entity; (5) whether tribal
officials exercise control over the entity’s administration and accounting; (6) whether
the Tribes’ governing bodies have the authority to dismiss members of the governing
bodies of the entity; (7) whether the entity generate their own revenues; (8) whether
a suit against the entity will affect the Tribes’ finances and bind or obligate tribal
funds; (9) the announced purposes of the entity; (10) whether the entity manage or
exploit tribal resources; and (11) whether protection of tribal assets and autonomy
will be furthered by extending immunity to the entity. Colorado ex rel. Suthers v. Cash
Advance & Preferred Cash Loans, 205 P.3d 389, 406 (Colo. App. 2008).
152
Missouri v. Webb, No. 11SL-CC01680 (St. Louis Cnty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 25, 2011);
http://www.narf.org/nill/bulletins/dct/documents/missouri_v_webb.html.
153
Missouri v. Webb, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41702 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 27, 2012).
154
Id. at *10-*11; see Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. at 171-72 (noting that the “doctrine
of sovereign immunity . . . does not immunize individual members of [a] Tribe.”).
155
Md. Comm’r of Fin. Regulation v. W. Sky Fin., LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
117665, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 12, 2011); W. Sky Fin., LLC v. Md. Comm’r of Fin.
Regulation, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107016, at 17 (D. Md. July 27, 2012).
151
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Financial, LLC.156 The case involves a forum-selection clause requiring
borrowers to submit to arbitration at a Native American reservation,157
which the plaintiffs contend cannot legitimately adjudicate such suits
or issue valid judgments.158 The lower court upheld the forum selection
clause, but the plaintiffs appealed and gained support from the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) who recently settled an enforcement action
against Payday Financial,159 and filed an amicus brief in support of the
plaintiffs on September 26, 2013.160 This is a fascinating case because it

Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, No. 12-2617, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16257 (7th
Cir., Aug. 22, 2014).
157
Id.
158
Brief for the FTC as amicus curiae, Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 94095 (2012) (No. 11-09288), 4, available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-files-amicus-brief-supporting-class-action-suitchallenges-payday-lenders-arbitration-practices/130913paydayfinancialbrief.pdf.
159
See FTC v. Payday Fin., LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141891 (D.S.D. Sept. 30,
2013) (granting in part and denying in part plaintiff’s (FTC) motion for summary
judgment). Regarding the allegedly unfair practice of bringing suit in tribal court, the
district court stated that it was “skeptical” that a South Dakota limited liability company
merely licensed with the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe become tribal members and
“thereby can invoke tribal court jurisdiction over the consumers under the language of
the consumer loan agreements,” but was not prepared to rule, so stated it will consider
further testimony on whether Payday Financial constitute a common enterprise
and whether Webb is personally liable for the violations by Payday Financial. Id. at
*44. Previously, the district court had denied the FTC’s motion for partial summary
judgment regarding the unfair practice to bring suit in the tribal jurisdiction. FTC v.
Payday Fin., LLC, 935 F. Supp. 2d 926, 926 (D.S.D. Mar. 28, 2013). In that opinion,
the court addressed the “thorny question of tribal court jurisdiction” over borrowers by
using typical language of Payday Financials loan agreements, but denied the motion
holding that the “record lacks information establishing that the Defendants are in fact
‘members’ of the tribe for purposes of the first Montana [450 U.S. at 565] exceptions;”
and “an ambiguity in the contract exists as to under what circumstances the non-Indian
is consenting to tribal court jurisdiction in addition to binding arbitration.” See FTC,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141891 at 40. But see J.L. Ward Assocs., Inc. v. Great Palins
Tribal Chairmen’s Health Bd., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1171-77 (D.S.D. 2012) (evaluating
circumstances where an entity created under state law, rather than incorporated under
tribal law, by various tribes to represent the tribe possesses tribal sovereign immunity).
Id.
160
See FTC Files Amicus Brief Supporting Class Action Suit that Challenges Payday
Lender’s Arbitration Practices, Fed. Trade Comm.’n (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.
ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/09/ftc-files-amicus-brief-supporting-classaction-suit-challenges.
156
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combines two “hot topics” in law: payday lending regulation and arbitration clauses.
The appeal addressed the question of whether, pursuant to an arbitration provision in the loan contract, the defendants can require borrowers’ claims against them be resolved by arbitration on the Reservation
conducted by representatives of the Tribe.161 The court determined
that the lower court wrongly dismissed the case and that the arbitral
mechanism specified in the agreement was “illusory.”162 Interestingly,
Payday Financial, which is one of the many entities owned by Martin A.
Webb,163 claimed tribal immunity, but is incorporated in South Dakota.164
In addition, only its operator, Webb, is a member of the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe.165 The entity has not lent, nor targeted, tribal members or
residents of South Dakota, but claim Montana’s exemption applies.166
Under Montana v. United States, a tribe only has the power to regulate non-Native Americans on “Indian land” in two circumstances: (1)
regulatory authority over “taxation, licensing, or other means, and the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases,
or other arrangements”; and (2) when the conduct of the non-Native
Americans on the reservation “threatens or has some direct effect on
the political integrity, economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.”167 However, under the loan documents, the agreement is “subject solely to the exclusive laws and jurisdiction of the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe, Cheyenne River Indian Reservation,” and contains a clause
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16257, *6; see also Brief for the FTC as amicus curiae,
Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, at 5.
162
Id. at *13. Webb also owns Western Sky Financial, LLC. Id.
163
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16527, *1.
164
Id. at *13. Webb also owns Western Sky Financial, LLC. Id.
165
Id at 8. Interestingly, one of Mr. Webb’s other entities, Western Sky Financial
LLC, states on its website, as a disclaimer on the main page, that “WESTERN SKY
FINANCIAL is owned wholly by an individual Tribal Member of the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe and is not owned or operated by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe or any of
its political subdivisions. WESTERN SKY FINANCIAL is a Native American business
operating within the exterior boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation,
a sovereign nation located within the United States of America.” See WESTERN SKY
FINANCIAL, http://www.westernsky.com/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2013).
166
See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (a tribe has the authority to regulate “the activities
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealings [or] contracts”).
167
Id. at 565-66.
161
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stating “no other state or federal law or regulation shall apply to this
. . . [a]greement, its enforcement or interpretation.”168 The arbitration
clause in this contract mandates the forum is the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe Nation.169 The arbitrators are, by the plaintiff’s choice, “either (i) a
Tribal Elder, or (ii) a panel of three (3) members of the Tribal Counsel”;
and the arbitration “shall be conducted in accordance with the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribal Nation’s consumer dispute rules and the terms of this
Agreement.”170
On May 22, 2013, the Seventh Circuit issued a “limited” remand to
the district court, requesting a finding of fact on whether (1) applicable
tribal law is readily available to the public and, if so, under what conditions; and (2) the arbitrator and method of arbitration required under the
parties’ contracts are actually available.171 In August, the district court
responded in the affirmative to the first question, finding that the law of
the tribe “can be acquired by reasonable means,” even though the plaintiffs were only able to secure a copy after numerous failed attempts and at
a greater cost than the defendants.172 However, regarding the availability
of tribal arbitration, the court answered with “a resounding no.”173 Based
on the New Hampshire Banking Department’s investigation, the court
concluded there was no “methodized” tribal arbitration process and the
defendants “promise of a meaningful and fairly conducted arbitration

2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16527, *5.
Id. at 9.
170
Id. at *23; Opening Brief of Appellants Jackson at 6, Jackson v. Payday Fin.,
LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94095 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2012), appeal docketed, No.
12-2617 (7th Cir., Sept. 21, 2012). The agreement also stated that “YOU HEREBY
AGREE THAT YOU ARE WAIVING YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL, TO HAVE
A COURT DECIDE YOUR DISPUTE, TO PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS ACTION
LAWSUIT, AND TO HAVE CERTAIN DISCOVERY AND OTHER PROCEDURES
THAT ARE AVAILABLE IN A LAWSUIT . . . . [The] parties agree that the arbitrator
has no authority to conduct class-wide proceedings . . . . The validity, effect and
enforceability of this waiver of class action lawsuit and class-wide Arbitration is to be
determined solely by a court of competent jurisdiction located within the Cheyenne
[River] Sioux Tribal Nation, and not by the arbitrator . . . . ” Id.
171
Order, Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, No. 12-2617 (7th Cir. May 22, 2013), 1-2.
172
District Court’s Response to Court of Appeals Remand for Finding of Fact at 2;
Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, (No. 11-09288). (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2013), 2.
173
Id. at 6.
168
169
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is a sham and an illusion.”174 Recently, the Seventh Circuit determined
that the district court should not have dismissed the plaintiff ’s actions
since the “mechanism specified in the agreement is illusory,” and dismissed the argument that the loan documents require any litigation to
be conducted under tribal law, not federal law, thus “exhaustion in tribal
courts is not required.”175 This case should serve as a strong warning
for those private, non-tribal entities, who engage in payday lending
off-reservation, but claim tribal immunity and tribal forum selection,
to adhere to federal regulatory laws and not hide behind the legitimate
shield of tribal sovereign immunity.
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit has an appeal pending in Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc.176 Unlike
Jackson v. Payday Financial, the lower court found the arbitration agreement to be void.177 This case also involves Western Sky Financial, LLC,
and Webb. The plaintiff, Inetianbor, was loaned $2,525, with an annual
interest rate of 135%, by Western Sky Financial, but CashCall, Inc. was
the servicer, handler, and collector of the loan.178 Inetianbor claimed
that he had paid the loan off in full, but CashCall has continued to report
to credit bureaus that Inetianbor has upcoming or late payments.179
Thus, the claim was for defamation of Inetianbor’s character through
the misrepresentation of his creditworthiness to credit reporting agencies.180 Like Jackson v. Payday Financial, the loan agreement required

Id. at 4, 6; see also 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16527, *24-25 (the 7th Circuit noted
that the arbitration forum required by Payday Financial “does not exist: The Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe ‘does not authorize arbitration,’ it ‘does not involve itself in the
hiring of . . . arbitrator[s],’ and it does not have consumer dispute rules.”).
175
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16527, *1.
176
See Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 2013 WL 4494125, 1 (S.D.Fla. 2013), appeal
docketed, No. 13-13822 (11th Cir., Oct. 30, 2013).
177
Id.
178
Id. at 2.
179
Id.
180
Id.
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all disputes be arbitrated under the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation,
and the terms appear to be identical.181
After Inetianbor brought suit in state court and CashCall removed
to district court, CashCall filed a motion to compel arbitration, which
was granted on February 13, 2013.182 However, in March of 2013,
Inetianbor filed a Motion to Reopen Case due to the fact that when he
attempted to submit the case for arbitration to the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe Nation, he received a letter from a tribal judge stating that tribe
“does not authorize Arbitration as defined by the American Arbitration
Association . . . on the [reservation].”183 CashCall responded that the
arbitration could be conducted by a tribal member, but failed to clarify
the contention with the letter.184 However, the court determined that the
arbitral forum was unavailable, and given the fact the choice of forum
was “integral to the agreement to arbitrate,” the agreement failed.185 In
spite of the court’s granting of reopening the case, CashCall requested
arbitration before a tribal elder.186 CashCall explained, through the use
of a letter from the same tribal judge, that the tribal court does not have
arbitration, but, through contractual agreement, arbitration is permissible on the reservation, and if there is an award, the parties may seek
confirmation in Tribal Court.187 Due to this evidence, the court deter-

See id. The agreement all disputes arising out of the agreement “be resolved by
Arbitration, which shall be conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by
an authorized representative in accordance with its consumer dispute rules and the
terms of this Agreement.” The agreement further provides that
Arbitration shall be conducted in the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by your
choice of either (i) a Tribal Elder, or (ii) a panel of three (3) members of the Tribal
Council, and shall be conducted in accordance with the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal
Nation’s consumer dispute rules and the terms of this Agreement . . . . The party
receiving notice of Arbitration will respond in writing by certified mail return receipt
requested within twenty (20) days. You understand that if you demand Arbitration,
you must inform us of your demand of the Arbitrator you have selected. You also
understand that if you fail to notify us, then we have the right to select the Arbitrator.
Id at 2-3.
182
Id at 3.; see Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 923 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1363-64 (S.D.Fla.
2013).
183
Inetianbor, 2013 WL 4494125 at 3.
184
Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen Case, Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc.,
2013 WL 1325327 (S.D.Fla., Apr. 1, 2013).
185
Id.
186
Inetianbor, 2013 WL 4494125 at 2.
187
Id.
181
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mined the forum was available.188 However, just a few months later, the
district court found the arbitration agreement void due to the “integral”
nature of the tribe being the arbitral forum.189 The district court determined the tribal elder selected was not an “authorized representative of
the tribe,” nor did CashCall selected an authorized representative of the
tribe, therefore the “arbitral forum” was unavailable.190 Additionally, the
court discovered that the tribe had no “consumer dispute rules,” which
were indicated in the original arbitration clause.191 CashCall’s appeal
argues that the arbitral forum is not “integral” to the arbitration agreement and the conclusion that the arbitral forum was unavailable was
incorrect.192 It is unlikely that CashCall will prevail on these arguments,
even though courts tend to construe arbitration agreements liberally as
to maintain enforceability.
These are just some of the most recently enforcement actions and
suits involving Native American payday lending companies, particularly
those who are not actually tribal entities and simply locate themselves
on reservations to evade state and federal consumer protection laws.193
Although there are legitimate payday lending companies associated
with Native American tribes, it is important to note that all of the above
cases are all linked to Martin A. Webb and all of the agreements invoke
the jurisdiction of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation in South
Dakota. Although, Western Sky Financial announced in August an end
to servicing loans due to heavy regulations,194 regulatory agencies are
still pursuing these entities, including the CFPB who sued CashCall for
illegal online loan servicing in December.195

Id.; see Order Denying Reconsideration, Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 2013 WL
2156836 (S.D.Fla., May 17, 2013).
189
Inetianbor, 2013 WL 4494125 at 6.
190
Id. at 5.
191
Id. at *6.
192
Principal Brief of Appellant CashCall, Inc., Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., No. 1313822 at 16. (11th Cir., Oct. 30, 2013).
193
See Payday Lending, Fed. Trade Comm’n, http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
media-resources/consumer-finance/payday-lending (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
194
See The Editorial Board, Cracking Down on Predatory Payday Lenders, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2013, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/
opinion/cracking-down-on-predatory-payday-lenders.html?src=recg&_r=0.
195
See CFPB Sues CashCall for Illegal Online Loan Servicing, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-suescashcall-for-illegal-online-loan-servicing/.
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III. Policy Recommendations
The sovereignty of Native American tribes is extremely important
and should not be overturned. However, it is time to revisit the expansive nature of this immunity, in particular the ability of tribes to “hide
behind” their immunity in order to engage in usury business practices
or enable outsides to utilize tribal immunity beyond the intended nature.
Tribes have been able to become economically viable and the reservations have become a source of potential prosperity, with nearly half of
all Native American tribes benefiting from casinos and other gaming
revenues.196 Tribes have also been expanding their revenue sources:
from owning construction firms, advertising companies, and engaging
in online short-term lending.197 Although prosperity has not touched all
tribes, in particular the Oglala Lakota members residing on the Pine
River Ridge Reservation,198 it is time to embrace change, which is
reflected in the recent decisions by the courts.
As tribes diversify their economic sources, the business of short-term
consumer credit loans, better known as payday loans, has grown enticing. Although most scholars view payday lending as an unscrupulous
practice, there is a great need for short-term loans for the underserved
and underbanked.199 Without them people’s lives would be turned upside
down.200 There is a way for tribes to take advantage of the economic
potential, but not hide behind immunity to engage in usury practices
that are being prevented by regulators, such as the CFPB and FTC. In
2011, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“the Dodd-Frank Act”) changed the United States financial industry and Native Americans were not exempt from this change.201 The
See Conrad Wilson, Native American Tribes Venture Out of Casino Business,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/21/172630938/nativeamerican-tribes-venture-out-of-casino-business.
197
Id. (discussing the Winnebago tribe’s ownership of dozens of businesses in
numerous states (reservation is in Nebraska), with revenue in 2011 topping $250
million).
198
See Nicholas D. Kristof, Poverty’s Poster Child, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2012, at A29,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/kristof-povertys-posterchild.html?_r=0 (discussing the devastating poverty that exists in the Pine Ridge
Indian Reservation).
199
See Rosette & Bazzazieh, supra note 110, at 808.
200
Id.
201
P.L. 111-203, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/
html/PLAW-111publ203.htm.
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Dodd-Frank Act explicitly recognizes tribal regulatory authority over
tribally owned online consumer lending businesses.202 The Dodd-Frank
Act also requests that the agency and tribes work together to ensure fair
regulations.203
In 2012, the Native American Financial Services Association
(“NAFSA”) was formed as a trade association to “protect and advocate
for Native American sovereign rights” and to “enable tribes to offer
responsible online lending products.”204 The formation of NAFSA was
an important step for cooperation between federal and state regulators
and legitimate Native American tribal entities engaged in legal payday
lending. According to NAFSA, member tribes follow applicable tribal
and federal laws and agree to “abide by a strict set of industry-leading
best practices205 to ensure that consumers can trust NAFSA members
to honor their rights, protect their privacy, treat them fairly, and constantly strive to offer them innovative alternative financial products.”206
NAFSA has vocally demonstrated the distinction between legitimate
Native American tribal entities and those who are not actually triballyowned. Most recently, Barry Brandon, the executive director of NAFSA,
applauded the New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman’s lawsuit
against Western Sky Loans,207 stating the distinction “between those

See Rosette & Bazzazieh, supra note 110, at 802; contra Tribal Payday Lending,
http://www.modrall.com/Files/Docs/Tribal%20Payday%20Lending.pdf (last visited
Mar. 18, 2013) (writing “a question remains as to whether the Dodd-Frank Act applies
to tribes or tribal entities”); see also 12 U.S.C.A. § 5481 (Lexis 2011); .
203
Id.
204
See About the Native American Financial Services Association, Native American
Fin. Serv. Ass’n, http://www.mynafsa.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2013); see also
Barry Brandon, Understanding legitimate online tribal lending, The Hill (Oct. 2,
2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/325949-understandlegitimate-online-tribal-lending (discussing the distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate tribal online lenders).
205
See NAFSA Financial Lending Best Practices to Protect and Inform Consumers,
Native American Fin. Serv. Ass’n (last visited Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.mynafsa.
org/best-practices/ (providing the “best practices” for NAFSA Member lenders to
engage in).
206
See Sean Sposito, Online Lender Western Sky Shutters Payday Business, American
Banker (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_166/onlinelender-western-sky-shutters-payday-business-1061606-1.html.
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See Christie Smythe, Online Lender Western Sky Sued by N.Y. Over Rates,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-12/onlinelender-western-sky-sued-by-n-y-over-rates.html.
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tribal government-owned businesses who operate legally under federal law, and those who seek to profiteer on the back of hundreds of
years of government-to-government relationships.”208 It is important to
remember that there are legitimate payday lending companies organized
under tribal law, and tribal immunity should not be sacrificed due to the
wrongdoings of a few.
In recent years, the need for sovereign immunity and the unenforceability of arbitration clauses has declined, and Native American businesses and their tribal entities are no longer the consistent underdog
in which the playing field needs to be leveled. It is likely the Supreme
Court will in due time hear a case regarding the use of mandatory arbitration clauses which pick tribal courts and reservations as the governing forum—a forum foreign to most involved. Although there was a
concern that the Court, in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,
would restrict the blanket immunity enjoyed by the tribes, both on and
off the reservation, the Court rejected Michigan’s call to overturn Kiowa
and limit tribal sovereign immunity to activities conducted only on
tribal lands.209 Even though the Court ultimately decided not to restrict
tribal sovereign immunity to only on-reservation activities, it was a
5-4 decision, with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg each writing
individual dissents.210 It may be best for tribes to relinquish some, but
not all, of their immunity, especially in regards to commercial activities
that take place off-reservation. This would likely preserve some of the
immunity, that which is used for its original purpose.
CONCLUSION
Since the formal recognition of tribal sovereign immunity by the
United States Supreme Court in 1940,211 Native American tribes have

See Jessica M. Karmasek, Head of Native American association applauds N.Y. AG’s
lawsuit against Western Sky, Legal Newsline (Aug. 13, 2013), http://legalnewsline.
com/news/243531-head-of-native-american-association-applauds-n-y-ags-lawsuitagainst-western-sky.
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134 S. Ct. 2024, 2027 (2014) (holding that Bay Mills is protected by tribal sovereign
immunity and the suit against them by Michigan for opening a casino outside Indian
land is barred since “Congress has not abrogated tribal sovereign immunity from a
State’s suite to enjoin gaming off a reservation or other Indian land.”); Kiowa Tribe,
523 U.S. at 758.
210
Id. at 2038, 2039; see supra note 49.
211
See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 512-13.
208

180

THE ARBITRATION BRIEF

Volume 4

made significant strides in economic prosperity and have become enticing partners for outside business. This, along with the combination of
increasing use of arbitration clauses, has led to some confusion regarding the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses in payday lending agreements. The courts have distinguished between those entities
which are “arms of the tribal governance,” and thus should be entitled
to the same protections of tribal immunity, and those who are not, but
there is still not a bright-line rule, nor should there necessarily be one.
This paper has examined the historical status of both arbitration
clauses and tribal sovereign immunity, in addition to the unique nature
of tribal courts, the use of arbitration clauses today, and the business
concerns. Even though each tribal jurisdiction has its own rules and
procedures regarding enforceability of contracts, arbitration, and granting of awards, any concerns can be overcome by due diligence. As
demonstrated by the recent litigation and the ongoing debate regarding
payday lending in general and the sweeping nature of tribal sovereignty,
it is likely that the issues of enforceability of arbitration contracts mandating tribal jurisdiction, especially involving lenders who are not true
tribal entities, is not going away and the Court will be forced to address
the issue once and for all. Although there are those who seek to take
advantage of the sovereign immunity provided to Native American
tribes and engage in usury practices, they are not the majority, and it
is vital to distinguish between legitimate tribal businesses engaged in
payday lending and those who are simply hiding behind a false tribal
immunity.

